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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sues, but double jeopardy is not here applicable since these depart-
mental charges are civil in nature. It was held that there was
no difference in principle between a case where a witness offers
to testify after refusing at a previous trial, and that of a witness
who later recants his testimony given at a previous trial. In the
latter case, the recantation amounts to newly discovered evidence,
which, in a proper case, is grounds for a new trial .2  The instant
situation was held to be analogous and the same principle to
apply.
The Appellate Division had come to the same conclusion by
carefully distinguishing the previous line of cases invoking res
judicata and apparently holding that, new charges and new evi-
dence being introduced, the issues at the second trial were not
identical with those of the first.23 The Court of Appeals assumed
that the charges and issues were the same, notwithstanding the
additional charges of perjury, but nevertheless found that a sec-
ond trial was proper. It is in this that the real significance of the
case is to be found. It appears that the application of res judicata
is not necessary even where the charges and issues are the same,
so long as evidence is available which was, not so before.
Requirement of Hearing
In acting in an adjudicatory capacity, an administrative
agency, like a court of law, must accord the parties affected a
full and fair hearing. -4 Hence, where the exercise of a statutory
power adversely affects property rights, due process requires that
courts imply the requirement of notice and hearing even though
the statute involved may contain no provision for a hearing.2
Such a situation is presented by Hecht v. Monaghan,2 involv-
ing the hack licensing provisions of the New York City Charter.27
Provision is made for revocation of such licenses in designated
cases, 8 but nowhere is it provided that a hearing be held prior
to revocation.
The Court of Appeals has recently held that an individual's
driver's license is a thing of such value as to constitute property
22. People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733 (1916).
23. Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N.Y. S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't 1953).
24. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U.S. 88 (1913).
25. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), Bauer v. Acheson, 106
F. Supp. 445 (D. C. D. C. 1952), People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of
Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1. 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
26. 307 N. Y. 461, 121 N. E. 2d 421 (1954).
27. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 436, NEv Yoix CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 436-2.0.
28. NEw YoRx CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 436-2.0 (27).
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which may not be taken away except by due process.29 In addi-
tion, in a case such as this, a hack driver's license being a condi-
tion precedent to his making of a living, it may be said that the
driver has a property right in the libense from this point of view. 0
Hence, in a proceeding to revoke the petitioner's license for al-
leged withholding of change from passengers, due process re-
quired a hearing, though the statute was silent.
In the instant case, a "hearing" was actually afforded the
petitioner but it was found insufficient on several grounds. The
court pointed out that no essential of a fair trial may be omitted
at such a hearing. "The party whose rights are being determined
must be fully apprised of the claims of the opposing party and of
the evidence to be considered, and must be given the opportunity
to cross examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evi-
dence in explanation or rebuttal.' ' s Here, the "hearing" con-
sisted of a reading of a hack bureau memorandum and an identi-
fication of the driver by the complainants. No actual testimony
was taken, no sufficient previous notification was given petitioner,
and the "record" on which he was suspended was insufficiently
set out.
Power to Compel Production of Documents
The power of investigating committees and commissions to
compel the production of relevant documents and papers is re-
affirmed in Alexander et al. v. New York State Commission to In-
vestigate State Agencies in Relation to Parl-Mutual Harness Rac-.
ing. 2
Though the power of agencies to compel production of docu-
ments is not unlimited, it is quite broad. "The power to require
a witness to produce books and papers is necessarily limited to a
'proper case' . . . [which] is ordinarily one where the books and
-papers called for have some relevancy and materiality to the mat-
ter under investigation.' ' Hence a subpoena duces tecum will be
quashed ". . . only where the futility of the process to uncover
anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious. . . . " The ma-
jority of the court found the information demanded fell within
this definition.
29. Wignall v. "Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E. 2d 728 (1952).
30. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
31. Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352-353, 73 N.E. 2d 545, 547-548
(1947), Heaney v. McGoldrick, 286 N.Y. 38, 45, 35 N.E. 2d 641, 644 (1941), Matter
of Greenbaum v. Bingham, 201 N.Y. 343, 347, 94 N.E. 853, 854 (1911).
32. 306 N.Y. 421, 118 N.E. 2d 588 (1954). The respondent Conunission was
established under section 6 of the Executive Law.
33. Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 217-218, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935).
34. Judge Cardozo in Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 382, 176
N.E. 537, 539 (1931).
